The article below is an excerpt from our Q3 2025 commentary.
Global uranium markets have been awash in bullish developments over the past two years, as governments, utilities, investors, and even long-skeptical environmental groups have begun casting aside the narratives that constrained nuclear power for four decades. After years of stagnation—during which global generating capacity failed to recover from Fukushima—it was only in 2023 that nuclear output finally crept past its 2010 peak. Today, the outlook for nuclear power looks radically different.
In its newly released v, the World Nuclear Association (WNA) lays out a series of projections based on its assessment of global nuclear trends. From a 2025 base of 398 GWe of installed generating capacity, the WNA’s base-case scenario now expects capacity to reach 746 GWe by 2040—an increase of roughly 90% from today’s levels. Notably, that 746 GWe estimate represents an upward revision of nearly 10% from projections made just two years ago.
The WNA has also raised both its lower- and upper-bound forecasts. Its low-case scenario now calls for 552 GWe by 2040, an increase of 66 GWe over the 2023 outlook. Its high-case scenario has risen to 966 GWe, up 35 GWe from the prior estimate. Even under the WNA’s most pessimistic projection, global nuclear capacity is expected to expand by at least 40%.
On the uranium fuel side, the WNA now expects global reactor requirements to total roughly 179.1 million pounds this year. (It is worth noting that this figure sits nearly 3% above the already-bullish 177 million pounds of demand we ourselves projected just four years ago.) Under its base-case outlook, the WNA estimates that reactor demand will reach 330 million pounds by 2040—an extraordinary 90% increase from today’s levels.
In its upper-case scenario, the WNA projects reactor demand could rise to 530 million pounds, a truly immense expansion. Even the most conservative projection puts 2040 demand at 278 million pounds—almost 100 million pounds more than current consumption.
Given these enormous growth assumptions, the expansion of uranium supply over the next fifteen years will be critical. And on that front, the challenges are already beginning to surface. The supply problems emerging today will only deepen the structural deficits now developing in global uranium markets.
The uranium market in 2025 has already fallen in deficit when investment demand is included, and we believe uranium markets next year will slip into outright operating deficit. We estimated uranium mine supply in 2025 will reach 160 mm pounds, secondary supply will approximately 25 mm pounds, and investment demand will approach 10 mm pounds— producing a deficit of 5 mm pounds. For 2026 we estimate both uranium mine supply to be down and reactor demand to be up, producing an outright deficit in global uranium market before investment demand is factored in.
Problems are emerging on several fronts. In Kazakhstan, the eastern anchor of global uranium supply, Kazatomprom—the world’s largest producer—continues to struggle with its production expansion plans. After the sharp rebound in uranium demand in 2022, the company announced an ambitious target: an 11-million-pound increase in output, roughly a 20% rise. Then, in September 2023, Kazatomprom went further, outlining plans to lift 2025 production by an additional 12 million pounds, potentially bringing total output to 80 million pounds by utilizing 100% of the subsoil exploitation rights granted by the Kazakh government.
We met with Kazatomprom in Almaty in June 2024 and left with the clear impression that the company’s production guidance would need to be revised downward. Earlier that year, in a surprise announcement, Kazatomprom had already cut its 2024 production estimate by 10 million pounds. Yet at the time of our visit, management continued to maintain its 80-million-pound production target for 2025.
Much of the blame for the 2024 reduction had been attributed to shortages of sulfuric acid. But in our view, far deeper production issues were embedded in the company’s massive Budenovskoye 6 and 7 greenfield developments—projects beset by both political complications and geological difficulties.
Original plans called for the Budenovskoye projects to produce 13 million pounds of uranium by the end of 2025. After our visit, we came away with the strong conviction that this target was unattainable—a view we explored in detail in our essay “Uranium: A Drama in the Making,” which is readily accessible online.
In a development that stunned the uranium analytical community, Kazatomprom announced in September 2024 that it was cutting its 2025 production forecast from 80 million pounds to 69 million—a reduction of more than 10 million pounds.
The company has offered little insight into what is happening at Budenovskoye, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the bulk of the shortfall stems from organizational and construction delays at the project.
The disappointments have not stopped there. On August 22, the company revealed that it was reducing its 2026 subsoil use agreement with the Kazakh government from 32,777 tonnes to 29,697 tonnes—a 10% cut. Kazatomprom also noted that it is highly likely to exercise its “down-flex” option within the allowable 20% deviation under its newly lowered 2026 production framework. In practical terms, the company now expects to produce only 62 million pounds of uranium in 2026—five million pounds less than the reduced 2025 level.
Only a few years ago, Kazatomprom was projecting that it would produce 80 million pounds of uranium in 2025, and that, by utilizing 100% of its 32,777-tonne subsoil-use rights from the Kazakh government, 2026 production would rise to roughly 85 million pounds. Today, however, it appears that 2026 output will reach only 62 million pounds—a massive reduction from the 85-million-pound figure once presented as achievable.
In its first-half 2025 financial release, the company attributed most of the 10% production downgrade to “production adjustments” at Budenovskoye. Kazatomprom also noted that financing had finally been secured for an 800,000-tonne sulfuric acid plant—critical for the viability of the project—and that construction was underway on additional Budenovskoye processing facilities expected to add 6,000 tonnes of annual capacity. No timeline was provided for completion; the press release offered only that “construction … is progressing in accordance with its schedule.”
In earlier letters, we discussed the problems at Budenovskoye and the central role the project was expected to play in closing the emerging structural gap between global uranium supply and demand. It now appears that much of the project’s originally envisioned 15-million pound annual output may never materialize.
Uranium supply problems are not confined to the eastern hemisphere. Cameco—the largest uranium producer in the West—has also been forced to trim its 2025 production guidance for the McArthur River mine, one of the world’s premier uranium assets. The company had originally projected that McArthur River would produce 18 million pounds of uranium in 2025. However, due to development delays and slower-than-expected progress on groundfreezing operations, Cameco has lowered its forecast to between 14 and 15 million pounds.
Cameco has not indicated whether these issues will affect its 2026 production, and it is a development we will continue to watch closely. But the implications are clear: production setbacks at McArthur River add yet another data point to the growing evidence that supply constraints will only widen the uranium market’s emerging structural deficit in the years ahead.
Finally, we believe it is imperative to address one potentially significant risk to future supply. One of the largest sources of new uranium expected to enter the market between now and 2030 is NexGen’s Arrow/Rook I project in Saskatchewan. The mine has advanced almost completely through Canada’s multilayered permitting process. Provincial approval was granted in November 2023. The critical federal Environmental Impact Statement was accepted as final in January 2025.
Only one approval now remains before construction can begin: authorization from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC). The CNSC has scheduled two public hearings on the project—one this November and another in February 2026. Upon the successful conclusion of these meetings, the Commission will issue its decision.
If the CNSC grants approval—and we see no immediate reason to expect difficulties—the project can move directly into construction. And it is at that point, we believe, that the real challenges may begin.
The company has stated that it will take just under four years from the start of construction to first production. If the CNSC grants its approval for the Rook project at its February 9th meeting next year, that timeline would imply initial uranium output in early 2030.
We have been closely involved in numerous large-scale mine construction projects over the past thirty-five years, and based on that experience, we believe there is a meaningful risk that Rook’s schedule will slip. This is an enormous undertaking—one that requires not only the development of the mine itself but also the construction of a full ore- and uranium-processing complex.
NexGen is confident it can meet its aggressive timetable. But given the realities of northern Saskatchewan—its climate, its infrastructure limitations, its logistical constraints—we believe holding to that schedule will be extremely difficult. We want to emphasize that any delays should not be interpreted as a reflection on the quality of the project or its management. They would simply be the natural consequence of the complexities inherent in building a mine of this scale.
The last major uranium mine built in Canada was Cameco’s Cigar Lake. Construction began in 2005, with first production originally slated for 2007. Instead, the project quickly encountered severe development issues—most notably significant water incursion—that triggered years of delays. Cigar Lake eventually produced its first uranium eight years behind schedule.
The geology at Rook is markedly different from Cigar Lake, and similar flooding problems are not expected. Even so, large-scale mine developments always present unforeseen challenges. Delays are not the exception but the rule, and it would be highly unusual for a project of Rook’s scale to proceed without encountering setbacks.
Rook is projected to begin production at 21 million pounds per year, ramping to as much as 30 million pounds—a contribution unmatched by any other new uranium project over the next decade. Any delay in achieving those volumes will further widen the global uranium market’s structural deficit, particularly as demand accelerates into the 2030s.
According to the WNA’s newly released World Nuclear Fuel Report, uranium demand is set to surge between now and 2040—a conclusion we strongly share, given nuclear power’s formidable advantage in producing low-cost, carbon-free electricity. What remains far less clear is where the necessary uranium supply will come from.
Problems are already emerging at several of the world’s largest prospective sources of new production, and we believe the structural deficit in global uranium markets is poised to widen sharply in the near term as these supply issues continue to accumulate. We have highlighted two major setbacks that have surfaced recently, and a third—the Rook project— sits plainly on the horizon.
Over the past two years, the positive narrative around uranium has been driven almost entirely by demand. We believe that is about to change. Supply challenges may soon become the dominant force pushing uranium prices materially higher in the short term.
Curious to learn more now? Read more in our Q3 2025 research newsletter, available for download below.
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